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ROMANTICISM AND TAOISM: THE
PLANES OF CULTURAL ORGANIZATION
Vytautas Kavolis

I

The goal of a comparative study of civilizations can
only be a comprehension of mankind as a whole within
the full diversity of its major historical trajectories.*
But the study of civilizations lends itself peculiarly well,
by an inner logic of its own, to a kind of self-testing, a
critical evaluation of one's own stance toward life and
intellectual position in the light of the experience of
mankind as a whole. Civilizational studies constitute
themselves as an idiom of self-and-civilization.
It is possible to approach the world as Montaigne has
approached his own self—in the exploratory spirit of
perplexed curiosity to discover whatever is there; or
with the managerial intention to order, to control, and
to predict everything about it, exemplifed in the works,
on the one hand, of most evolutionary theorists, on the
other hand, of Spengler or Quigley. One may voyage
through the world in a mystical quest to be liberated
from the bondage of any provincialism and to enter into
a sacred union with humanity as a whole, in the manner
of Eliade or Le'vi-Strauss. And finally there is the analytical approach to the world—an endless effort to understand, with each step, a little more fully how the
human mind works in its diverse histories, as it comes
to grips with the seemingly endless variety of specific
predicaments, and therefore what possibilities we have
at our individual and collective disposal. Scholars as
diverse as Weber, Coulborn, Voegelin, Gebser,
Ricoeur, Needham, or Nelson have contributed to this
approach.
The four approaches to the world, taken separately,
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yield four different kinds of knowledge, which we might
designate as participation knowledge, domination
knowledge, salvation knowledge, and self-completion
knowledge. With the possible exception of the last,
these concepts have a familiar ring to sociologists of
knowledge. What might be added here are two hypotheses of special interest to the comparative study of
civilizations. First, the four approaches to the world
may constitute a repetitive sequence through which the
intellectual tradition of the study of humanity itself
develops: One starts in an exploratory stance, then the
managers and the mystics split, then the selfcompleting analysis makes its appearance.
Second, the comparative study of civilizations needs
to employ all four approaches to the world. Participation knowledge is not comprehensible enough. Domination knowledge is blind to whatever cannot be fully
described. Salvation knowledge disregards all demonstrable particularities irrelevant to a vision of redemption. Self-completion knowledge advances towards its
possible goal only if it is continuously challenged by
explorers, managers and mystics (and perhaps, for
humility's sake, by madmen as well, which is in any
case inevitable).
II
In principle, the study of civilizations, rather than of
societies or of cultures, demands (1) that attention be
paid to symbolic designs in their social contexts;
(2) that the complexes of symbolic designs and their
social contexts be related to the largest comprehensible
frames within which they have historically existed; and
(3) that these frames and their components be studied
as historical processes of emergence, transformation,
interchange across their boundaries with other civilizational traditions, and perhaps decay, dissolution, revival.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol5/iss5/2
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Civilizations can be defined as entities with written
histories of their own, within which states arise and
disappear, and languages become differentiated and replaced, without the basic pattern that encompasses
them losing the continuity of its distinctiveness.
Since a civilization is more extensive in space and in
time than any organized society, in talking about civilizations, one gives analytical priority—a priority not of
faith but of attention—to that which transcends any
particular social organization, namely trans-societal
symbolic designs. But, in studying civilizations, rather
than cultures, one must view symbolic designs not by
themselves, in a museum-like purity, but as sources of
social energies and as structures expressing or limiting
such energies. What one does in studying civilizations
is not intellectual or social history, since the primary
concern is not with the thoughts of particular individuals or with group actions, but with the deeper and more
general matrices or frameworks within which these actions and thoughts are generated and which they presuppose.
In practice, the following seem to be the types of
methodologies most prevalent in comparative civilizational studies. (1) The task may be conceived of as
the construction of an inventory of world-wide uniformities, as in the generalizations about the rise and
decline of civilizations or in hologeistic correlations
between the size of empires and creativity. A recent
study of this type reports that with industrialization in
various parts of the world similarity of values in the
cultural traditions does not increase, surely a finding of
some interest even to those who are skeptical of the
"scientific" method in cross-civilizational studies.
(2) At the opposite extreme one might locate a "presuppositionless' method best describable as a treasure
house of particularities. Few people would candidly
declare their adherence to this position, but comparisons of a bit from one civilization with a bit from an1
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other, where it is not clear what the theoretical significance of the comparison is, approximates to the
conception of comparative study as the gathering of all
possible comparisons.
(3) The treasure house of particularities is transformed into an intellectually fruitful method by the device that might be named the embedded dynamic detail.
Under this method, one chooses a significant element of
one civilization, views it in its embeddedness within the
total pattern of that civilization, considers its changes
over time, traces out its impact on its various social
settings—and then makes a search for what might be
considered its counterpart in another civilization. This
method allows an individual scholar to do important
work amidst the infinite perplexities of comparative
civilizational studies, in the manner, perhaps, of Louis
Dumont.
(4) But what the comparative study of civilizations
increasingly needs to make itself a coherent—as well as
shared—discipline is an empirically resonant, processually open classificatory system of major alternatives for organizing the experience of mankind at all
levels of differentiation and with regard to all key issues. This risky enterprise is the only possible approach
to a comprehensive, non-reductionist understanding of
the restless issues of consciousness and society. But
this method can be advanced only by a collectivity of
scholars who collaborate on defining the issues by
which to guide the works.
The starting point for the joint construction of such a
classificatory system might well be the notion of general
types of necessary elements which one might expect to
find, in some form, in all civilizations at some point in
their historical trajectories—but which are differently
dealt with in practice by the particular civilizations. We
need diverse inventories of such necessary elements,
constructed from the point of view of the several civilizations, of various intellectual traditions and cultural
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol5/iss5/2
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movements within them, of different scholarly disciplines, and of particular perspectives within the disciplines.
(5) There is a fifth method employed by some who do
comparative civilizational studies in order to discover a
spirituality that transcends and renders unimportant all
cultural particularities. The very interesting work of
Raimundo Panikkar leans in this direction. But this
looking through to a particularity-transcending spirituality is ultimately a method of contemplation rather
than of comparative study. Let us not neglect the possibility of a civilizational ecstatics. A comprehension, in
one's own way, of the totality of the experience of
mankind, with full respect to concrete diversity, is the
beginning of the only responsible spirituality conceivable in today's world. But it is only respect for particularities that renders a spirituality responsible.
Ill

And now to an extended example. I am currently
engaged with six planes of the organization of culture
that strike me as necessary elements of any civilization,
accessible for both intra- and inter-civilizational comparisons. These necessary elements—only one of several possible lists—are: perceptual set, structure of
consciousness, moral culture, mode of sensibility, form
of organization of knowledge, and dramatic design.
I was led to this particular list by long-standing analytical concerns, which many others have pursued before me, and partly by an effort to make sense of the
diversity and contradictory qualities of European
Romanticism in civilizational perspective. It is a peculiarity of what is comprehended as Romanticism that it
has produced mutually inconsistent meanings on the six
planes of cultural organization. This type of incoherence has nothing in common with the promiscuousness
of contemporary popular culture (or the "immense
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1980
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confusion" of the popular perception of Romanticism).
Romanticism is precise recognition of ambiguity and
contradiction, and each of its planes (at a given moment
of its historical trajectory) is exactly definable.
(1) Asa perceptual set, Romanticism indicates a disposition not merely to perceive, but to admire, such
qualities of experience as spontaneous diversity, flow,
transformation, and extraordinariness—to see these
qualities as naturally miraculous even when they generate disorder. It is, in large part, this perceptual
set—the opposite of the "classical"—that has made
social movements a subject of magic attraction to the
best and the worst of sociologists. Within this perceptual set, taken by itself, object love—attachment to
anything concrete—is replaced by process love. "Objectless longing" originates here.
(2) As a structure of consciousness (or general ideology, or explicit cosmology), Romanticism can be described by the following constellation of key terms (for
which, however, there are various partial equivalents):
A memorable individuality, whether of person or historical group, through alienations between and moves
toward identity of nature and spirit (or reason and
heart), seeks attunement with an unfinished and developing totality through its own best art, which is of
universal significance only when it is most deeply particular. It is this structure of consciousness—most
powerfully contrasting with the tragic—that mediates
between Christianity, after its transformation by the
Greeks, and Marxism.
In the European tradition, "nature" in general and
human "nature" in particular can spoil in the absence
of the proper "spirit," and so does "spirit" deprived of
its appropriate place in the "nature of things." Yet
there is, especially in certain secular derivatives from
Latin and Greek Catholicism, in which the sense of the
beauty of Lucifer is subliminally alive, nothing to prevent corruption from appearing beautiful, and supreme
2
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corruption supremely so. The result of this denaturalization of spirit and despiritualization of nature is the
"dark" Romanticism in which nature is regarded as
unredeemably corrupt—with Sartre, one becomes
"allergic to chlorophyll"—and original unity is therefore sought through "destructive transcendence" of
either "nature" or "spirit"—or of both simultaneously. In addition to its disturbing contribution to the
genesis of what its perpetrators proudly describe as
political terrorism, this conception has influenced modern Japanese but hardly Chinese poets: a nature devoid
of spirit, beautiful in its corruption, is conceivable
within a Buddhist as well as a Catholic, but not within a
Confucian or a Taoist tradition. For Puritan descendants (and Jews) corruption tends to remain ugly.
(3) As a mode of sensibility, or implicit organization
of feelings, Romanticism suggests cycles, or coexistences, of desiccation and vitality or, in dark Romanticism, of desecration and evocation, the latter gained by
unexpected intensities of emotion whether morbid or
salvific, treasured regardless of the suffering they may
cause, and regarded as having indestructible significance beyond their momentariness of experience. It
is within the Romantic sensibility—the opposite of
"bourgeois" prudential moderation—that passion to
the death, to a human being or cause, which dissolves
all boundaries and creates its own disciplines—but also,
in dark Romanticism, of crime, sickness, deformity,
and perversity—acquire the exaltation of deeper truth
and momentary royalty. In Tantrism such intensifications are managed, in Romanticism they must surprise
us.
(4) As a moral culture, or configuration of the basic
ideas and feelings about man's rights, duties, and limitations, Romanticism connotes the other-regarding obligation to prefer the ethics of compassion—"romantic
pity," as Shelley says—over the "liberal" ethics of
reason and enlightened self-interest. The Romantic
5
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moral culture also contains, and more profoundly, the
self-regarding obligation to know and to be one's own
authentic self, good, evil or mixed (but hardly "neutral"), to its most painful depths and to confess one's
selfhood in public, where revealing one's weaknesses
and transgressions openly, without hiding one's virtues, is more essential than restraining oneself from
these weaknesses and transgressions (Rousseau), an
attitude opposed above all to rigorous and systematic
self-control as well as obligatory humility. The
Romantic obligation of compassion feeds, or fades
away, into the ideological foundations of the welfare
society, on which it has probably had more influence
than Christianity directly; the Romantic duty to unrestrained authenticity dissolves, alas, into popcultural views of the individual.
(5) As a form of organization of knowledge, of putting together into a readable "text" that which is
"known" by the various human capacities of "knowing," Romanticism can be described as a juxtaposition
of fragments of systems and impressions of life. (Not
to be confused with Surrealism, a later stage of this
form, in which life itself becomes fragmented and systems melt down.)
(6) As a dramatic design for action, the Romance, in
Hayden White's phrase, is "fundamentally a drama of
self-identification symbolized by the hero's transcendence of the world of [ordinary] experience, his
victory over it, and his final liberation from it."
"But," in contrast to the Christian, the Moslem, or the
Communist, "the Romantic Hero does not expect any
ultimate relief." The Romantic changes the world by
investing it with significance. But he invests the world
with significance while himself lacking it: not a saint but
a hero marked by a deficiency, moving where victory is
indistinguishable from defeat. (There are also Romantic
bystanders who can be "purer," fleetingly, than
Romantic heroes.)
8
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Two further elements of the Romantic scheme of
things may be noted here: (7) the Romantic^^yc/io/ogj
of self-invention through compelling acts of consciousness and sensibility responding to the disharmonies of
culture and experience. Yet it is this self-producing
artifact, this man or woman of one's own invention, that
in the end discovers in its deepest inwardness something which has always been there, some givenness
within, a grounding affectivity, perhaps, as a "leader in
the grand style," Rosa Luxemburg, discovered: " . . . I
feel so much more at home . . . [she wrote] in the
meadows when the grass is humming with bees, than at
one of our party congresses . . . my inner-most self
belongs more to my titmice than to the 'comrades.' "
If the givenness within cannot be found, an awful emptiness emerges. Not for Romantics the happiness of the
void.
Finally, (8) the Romantic conception of the relationship between "text" and "reality," of words destroying their own meanings as constraints upon understanding, in the hope without faith of recovering, in a
few privileged moments, "true speech." (Reality, for
Romantics, is a momentary unification of fragmentary
experiences.) In this respect, Romanticism contrasts
with the Medieval notion of the text as an eternally valid
revelation of reality and the more contemporary ideas
of the text as an approximation to reality, as itself the
construction of whatever reality there is, or as an illusion without which it is impossible to speak about reality. Romanticism has regained a dimension of mysticism for secular thought.
Romanticism dissolves permanent categorial distinctions but centralizes the psyche—emotionally,
morally—for a powerful moment in time. But it acts
from within and is not calculating enough to adapt well
to material interests and the objective characteristics of
everyday life. It supports itself by its own spiritual
energies and is not sustained by the world (or not as
1 3
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much as, for example, Christianity is).
IV

The various components of Romanticism have different roots in or beyond recorded history and diverse
trajectories and semantic linkages in the various linguistic communities in which they have been employed
to make sense of individual experiences. These roots
and linkages have not yet been uncovered in sufficiently
differentiated depth. It will be possible here but to give a
few hints.
The Romantic perceptual set is a version of spontaneous psychocultural tendencies that appear to be repetitively generated, in second-century China as well as
in sixteenth-century England, by sociocultural breaks,
in the absence of a militantly dualistic religiosity, and
where elements of an aristocratic imagination have
been retained. But an approximation of this perceptual set has become a well-established constant in
Japan.
The Romantic structure of consciousness has been
viewed as a secularization of Plotinus, accomplished by
belated Renaissance hermeticists and over-rationalized
nature mystics in an age of rising liberalism. The dark
Romanticism can be regarded as an aestheticizing
transposition of the Gnostic spirit and some of the inner
demons of medieval Europe. A "clerical"—that is,
text-centered—way of life appears to be a necessary
prerequisite of either development. Warriors, craftsmen, merchants, peasants and bureaucrats would
neither invent the Romantic structure of consciousness out of their own existence nor find it particularly
appealing.
The compassionate side of the Romantic moral culture comes straight out of pietistic Christianity (but it
could have come out of Buddhism no less well). The
duty to authenticity and public self-revelation also
15
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seems to have Christian, perhaps ultimately Protestant
sources: once the obligation of self-directed moral development is removed, Rousseau's Confessions are not
too different from what the 17th-century Puritan divine,
Richard Baxter, describes as the giving of an "exact
account" of the "dark and passionate" plight of the
soul. But Baxter sought spiritual development
through such accounts, and for Rousseau it was enough
to give them straight (or to feel intensely that he was
doing so).
Romantic sensibilities are, to some degree, spontaneous reactions against rapid advances in various types
of "rationalization of the world" and the experience of
mechanical indifference such advances generate among
the heirs and the victims—sometimes the agents—of
the rationalizing achievements. But if one digs deep into
what Romantic sensibilities seem to presuppose, one
finds, on the other hand, some sense of the possibility of
"eternal forms" or a "treasure house in heaven" or the
"memory of mankind" in which all experiences of
extraordinary quality will be preserved and, on the
other hand, more archaically, traces of tricksters,
trances, spirit-wives, vampires, scapegoats, voyages of
the soul and feasts of fools—an uncanny primordial
sphere of horrifying insight and miraculous renewal in
the no-man's land between ordered community and
predictable nature, and perhaps between life and death,
which exists everywhere. (This is, at least within my
interpretation of Romanticism, its most ancient element. But it is not the key to Romanticism as a whole.
And it has to become an individual's interpretation of
literature before it qualifies as Romantic.)
The Romantic form of organization of knowledge
suggests a mind that is faced with the breakdown of all
possible systems of thought but still vividly remembers
their former greatness, and is not convinced of the
solidity of everyday experience but occasionally illuminated by its nuances: a disillusioned mind still inti18

19
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mate with a great heritage, kept alive by an occasional
subtlety, perhaps the mind of Montaigne caught between the religious wars.
The Romantic dramatic design originates deep in the
narrative mythology, it seems, particularly of the seagoing and nomadic (but not agricultural) peoples and
undergoes a variety of transformations, under aristocratic, eremitic, poetic, and eventually revolutionary
auspices, in a variety of places. The Romantic psychology of self-invention derives one of its sides, perhaps,
from Pico della Mirandola, the other, possibly, from
Petrarch.
Romanticism arises when these various planes begin
to resonate to each other; it ceases to exist when they
become mutually impermeable. What has happened to
Romanticism since the Romantic age is better described
as deconstellation than as decay.
V
The different components of Romanticism have historically tended to appeal to different social groups and
psychological types. The Romantic moral culture has
had its most reliable base in sections of the liberal
bourgeoisie, especially in its Protestant-influenced
Anglo-Saxon version. Romantic dramatic designs, in
forms ranging from chivalrous to "true love" stories in
popular magazines, have been popular far more widely
and among various social strata, from the nobility to the
urban proletariat, from St. Ignatius to Rousseau, with a
stronger attraction, in the lower classes, to women than
to men; and its appeal has extended far into nonWestern societies; Indonesia's Sukarno wrote his autobiography as a Romance.
Other elements of Romanticism have narrower appeals. The Romantic structure of consciousness galvanizes mainly the secular urban intellectuals of a religious, indeed prophetic bent. (This is the facet of
20
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Romanticism which has appealed more to secularized
Jews—as well as urban Latin Catholics—than to urban
Calvinists or East European peasant Catholics.) The
Romantic perceptual set attracts adolescents, aesthetic
souls, "post-modern" intellectuals; it is reflected in
Malayan biographies, and this tendency resists, in that
region, the influence of the firmer tradition of selfcomprehension of Islam. The Romantic mode of sensibility seems to speak to those who, without being economically deprived, suffer from both social and cultural
alienation, perhaps (in the twentieth century) more so in
the Catholic than in the Protestant parts of Europe,
especially France, Spain, and Latin America. The
Romantic form of organization of knowledge has its
clearest embodiment in English gardens, German
Romantic paintings, and its primary appeal is to the
non-political, non-religious litterateurs.
These are most tentative generalizations. But the
approach suggested here allows the dismantling of the
incomprehensible variety of Romanticisms beyond
their purely literary signification into definable symbolic entities, each with different boundaries in social
space and time—and in the architecture of particular
psyches.
VI

It would be methodologically desirable, in crosscivilizational comparisons, to ask what is distinctive
about one tradition from the point of view of the other,
and then reverse the perspective, turning what had been
the "alien" object of investigation into the "native"
standpoint of the questioner. Ideally, representatives of
several civilizations ought to collaborate in such exercises of shifting perspectives. But I can here only say in
what respects Taoism seems to me to be comparable
with and to differ from Romanticism on the six planes of
cultural organization, and invite Chinese scholars to tell
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1980
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me in what respects Romanticism differs from Taoism
in terms that they consider most relevant to such
cross-civilizational comparisons. The ultimate objective of such comparisons is to clarify what one is ultimately concerned with: a particular object, analytical
issues, the dangers of one's own attractions.
In its perceptual orientations to fluidity and change,
and in its sense for the generative chaos, Taoism is most
similar to Romanticism, except for the Romantic insistence on extraordinariness. In the Romantic scheme
of things, the extraordinary is always distinguishable
from the quotidian. The latter should be treated, where
the Romantic moral culture is active, with compassion,
but does not count, by itself, as significant. In the
Romantic universe of experience, most of what can
now be observed, or even sensed, in it has merely
factual existence but no significance, much in the same
manner in which the East European Jews appeared to
the German Jews before the Holocaust. (Some Romantics have sought to make everything extraordinary. But
this is what should become, not what is.) In Taoism the
ordinary in nature is as significant as anything can be,
though the religiously perfected man—or woman—has
extraordinary powers, which others lack. Romantics
are puritanic with their significations and profligate
with their energies; Taoists preserve their energies for
their own health and longevity (except at the highest
level of religious development, where it is possible to
expend energies without losing them) and tend toward
being profligate in their significations.
In the Taoist moral culture, it is assumed that compassion is generally spontaneous (somewhat in the
manner of the eighteenth-century notion of "irresistible
compassion," though less insistently). But there is
less specific demand for it than in the Romantic tradition. While military commanders are told in the Tao Te
Ching that compassion is essential for success (a
utilitarian calculation alien to Romantic morality), gen21
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eral indifference is often explicitly recommended: in
order to attain tranquility one should be "an uncarved
block." Natural spontaneity is sought, but what is
spontaneous is not in the least individualized, but
wholly general and normatively prescribed as "natural." Two key elements of Romantic morality exist in
Taoism as well, but with different weights and differing
contents.
The mode of sensibility of literary, as distinguished
from popular, Taoism in its attunement to tranquility, to
the fading away of the "drifting boat" of Chinese poetry
(an attraction which it shares with the Confucians), is in
exact opposition to the intensity-seeking Romantic sensibility. It is possible, within the Romantic scheme of
things, to be tranquil. But it is a fragile, momentary
tranquility between the wars, an accidental escape, not
the gradually emerging and then perpetual, at-homein-the-universe tranquility of the Taoists (attained by a
"natural process" of self-perfection of primordial energies in man from the sexual ching to the mindful shen,
merely aided by man's meditation techniques).
If Western concepts are to be employed here at all,
the dramatic design for human action favored by the
Taoist literary imagination would have to be described
as containing both "comical" and "visionary" elements. The comic design is a form of contests among
agents operating on the same level of existence, in a
"natural" universe of organic interdependence which
asserts itself in the end, sorts out the actors into their
naturally appropriate places, and provides whatever
meaning there can be found in human action. The visionary design is a form for overcoming the "alienation"
of the temporary from the eternal in man, in an ultimately unified and meaningful universe, architectonic
in Christianity, dance-like in Hinduism, energetic in
Taoism, or in the non-universe of Buddhism. The visionary differs from the romantic as the uniformitarian
from the diversitarian. It is the comic element that
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1980
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introduces diversitarianism—that is, quotidian
individualization—into visionary designs and thus
"humanizes" them, as in the Divine Comedy or Journey to the West.
The form of organization of knowledge favored by
literary Taoists can be described as a collection of poetic intuitions of unbroken natural-spiritual totality; it
contrasts sharply with the brokenness, fragmentariness, necessary imperfection, and the sense of incomplete grasp of the Romantic organization of knowledge.
The Taoist structure of consciousness lends itself
best to a more detailed comparison with the Romantic
structure of consciousness. These two structures can
be viewed—at least if Romanticism is taken as the point
of departure—as consisting of the same basic elements
in different arrangements. The notion of the identity of
nature and spirit is shared by Taoism and Romanticism.
In philosophic Taoism this identity is an ever-present
given which can only be forgotten but never lost. In
Romanticism it has either been already lost or not yet
attained, thus not a given at all but a supreme possibility
for which, in the characteristic manner of the secular
West, one has to risk one's all without any guarantee of
success.
Taoism is heavily biased toward a stabilizing connectedness, a changing but unevolving continuity of
universal alternation of apparent opposites in a pattern
of repetitive circularity. Romanticism balances (in
practice, at any given time, disharmoniously, but in
theory, and in the long run, harmoniously) between
connectedness and disconnection. Romanticism is full
of such balances, it is never one-sided, as Taoism is
most of the time, and it is for this reason that it might
qualify as the most adult dream of mankind, and most
completely adult: a dream (a) containing all essential
opposites within itself, and (b) known to be capable of
collapsing, and perhaps collapsing at any moment, yet
26
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worth retaining in human memory, in the memory of
strangers, even when it has collapsed. The Romantic
conception of adulthood: firm knowledge of historically
variable limitations of self and the world, strong sense
of the enduringly admirable, and the horrifying, in acts,
in qualities, and in environments.
Within the Romantic structure of consciousness, it is
only by one's own best art—that is, by a sort of selftranscending artifact, which man also is—that one can
hope to overcome the split between nature and spirit
(or, in a distortingly schematized form, between "fact"
and "value"). The comparable connecting link in religious Taoism is spiritual-bodily technique (breath
exercises, meditation and sexual techniques, macrobiotic diet) by which the unity of body and spirit is not
so much attained as asserted, provided the techniques
are performed with the attitude appropriate for them.
Art is an important part of the Taoist (or, more generally, Chinese) tradition. But it is not the operating key
without which the whole "system" breaks down utterly, as would Romanticism. In the Taoist scheme of
things at its most sophisticated art is the expression of
the experience of a harmonious embeddedness of the
conscious detail of nature in the totality to which it
belongs. Romantic art is "spiritual work," the means of
salvation; Taoist art "spirited leisure," the consciousness of nature that does not need to be saved. (And yet
there is an essential core of spirited leisure—the spontaneous poetic experience—inside the necessary spiritual work in Romanticism, equivalent to the givenness
within of the Romantic psychology of self-invention.)
The Romantic universe operates by (unpredictable)
additions to it, the Taoist universe by (non-contributory) attunements with it. In Taoism, the artificial is a nominalistic illusion that will eventually evaporate by itself. In Romanticism, the artificial (insofar as it
is not art) is a very real prison that one must fight
against—without hope of a final victory in one's own
28
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life or in anyone's time. Everyone has his/her own
struggle, though in its course one discovers unexpected, all-significant spiritual congenialities—the essence of Romantic sociability—with others. (But these
are congenialities of the deformed and of fighters: containing large imperfections and violent destructiveness
within universal compassion and the mystery of resonating, quietly, with a few others to some of the same
ultimates. None of this deformation and fighting in
Taoist sociability.)
The emancipatory schema of the Romantic paradigm
can itself become a prison, and indeed this is how evil
arises, where it does arise, in secular Romanticism: as
"iron necessity" or "blind compulsion," as mere
structure—outward or inward—emerging out of the
fluidity of the moving contradictions of experience but
incapable of resonating to them. ("He reasons but
does not resonate" is a Romantic's definition of a cognitively evil man.)
A schematically conceived process of liberation is,
by Romanticism's own premises, a prison: artifice
rather than art. Schematic liberation is the betrayal that
transforms romanticism into terrorism. But without
schemas the objective of analytic practice escapes its
own grasp. To analyze human life is to live precariously
balanced between betrayal and escape: a principle that
holds for civilization analysis no less than for any other.
From the Taoist point of view, Romanticism can be
accused of containing both poison and antidote in its
design—and of employing too much art in the effort at
being natural in society.
But which other secular scheme of things contains as
much antidote to its own poisons as Romanticism
does? By its sobriety and tough-mindedness Romanticism surpasses them all.
30
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VII

On each of the several planes of organization of cul-
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ture, Romanticism encounters, within Western civilization, competitors with which it is habitually confused. What is now popularly known as "romantic
love" usually lacks the sense that only highly select,
exalted emotions matter, that they matter regardless of
the suffering they cause, and that they matter in all
eternity. This sense is a definitional part of Romantic
sensibility. In its absence "romantic love" relocates
itself within the egalitarian Sentimentalist paradigm,
within which all feelings, regardless of their ordinariness , matter, and matter equally, but matter only during
the election (or, in this case, the affair).
In contrast to Sentimentalism, assorted pop-Oriental
religious loves, sociological labeling theories and other
egalitarian paradigms, Romanticism contains a highly
demanding principle of selection, an exalted conception
of the hidden potentialities of man (and, especially,
woman) and accepts only what is appropriate to that
conception. In this respect, Romanticism retains an
enduring educational significance in a secularized egalitarian culture as an ever-reviving principle of selectivity by which that which is worth enduring can be distinguished from routine productions, from an all-blurring
"mass culture," though Romanticism does not well
distinguish sanity from madness. Only Romanticism
shows signs, among the secular traditions of democratic
societies, of being able to solve Tocqueville's problem
of preserving individuality in a democracy, even though
in a manner entailing high risk.
What is risky is of course especially seductive to
people with Romantic sensibilities. It is not criteria of
selection suggestive of spiritual hierarchies, not of people but of experiences and of works, but the fatal attraction to the unexpected festival which has a way of
turning into a catastrophe that is dangerous about
Romanticism. (This attraction has much to do with the
Romantic attitude toward disorder: orderliness disguising a volcano, higher order hidden away in apparent
disorderliness.)
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Confusion of paradigms is one problem, the coexistence or conflict of different paradigms in the same
group or individual is another. This is frequently the
case with Anglo-Saxon liberals of the tradition of
Thomas Jefferson and John Stuart Mill: the Romantic
moral culture of compassion and of the search for individual authenticity coexists with the liberal moral culture of rational calculation of consequences and of the
artificial construction of everything social. It is this
extension that renders American liberals as a group
incapable of coherent policy. But it has also saved
American liberalism from the cultural desiccation of the
more purely rational European liberalism.
As moral cultures, the liberal and the romantic can
either compete or coexist in the same minds (the liberal,
since Emerson, as the container, and the romantic as
the contained, with the possibility, on certain spectacular occasions, of inverting the container with the contained). But as a structure of consciousness, liberalism
must compete and it is handicapped in competing with
its major challengers by the absence of a conception of
totality not reducible to the acts of its component parts.
Since the liberal tradition lacks a conception of ultimate
totality, it gains a certain temporary pragmatic maneuverability, but it cannot generate dramatic designs of
imaginative depth and moral appeal that either the nature of man's living in society or the human "natures"
of a great many individuals demand. Liberals must
therefore either borrow the dramatic designs of other
types of consciousness—nationalist, romantic, socialist, or religious—, or they cannot respond, on the level
of either civilizational design or personal experience, to
the search for dramatic designs and intuitions of totality
by which so many anti-liberal movements are motivated.
It seems impossible to confuse the liberal tradition
which centers on the idea that the individual is capable
of rational choices and therefore responsible for his
33
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choices, with the contemporary counter-culture of irresponsible determinism, favored by all sorts of
bureaucracies and technocracies and expressed in
various types of behavioral science-therapeutic tradition, in which man is treated as subject to psychological, or economic, or organizational, or linguistic, or
even civilizational determinisms.
In all respects except the inhospitality to dramatic
designs, the culture of irresponsible determinism is the
exact opposite of the liberal moral culture. And yet the
two symbolic frameworks are frequently confused,
both by critical outsiders and by those within. One
begins to long for a "rectification of names" sensitive to
the defining characteristics of the symbolic structures
for the conduct of human existence as well as to their
changes over time.
But it is only the most practical common sense to
presume that there must be at least seven types of spirit
beyond each name.
VII

What happens to people when they take Romanticism seriously depends on (1) which plane, or facet, of
Romanticism, in which stage of its historical trajectory,
they take seriously, and (2) what, in their own social
settings, they specifically repudiate in Romanticism's
name. While there are "intrinsic" elements in Romanticism, what it looks like in particular national, religious, political settings depends also on its "accidental" characteristics, on what particular Romantics
polemicize against—in France and Spain, against traditional clericalism and the bourgeoisie aligned with it; in
Germany and England, against modernist rationalization, but only in Germany in the "priestly" manner; in
Russia, against feelinglessness in personal life; in
nineteenth-century Italy and Poland, against historical
injustices to one's nation, to cite only some distinctive,
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though not exclusive, emphases. The same is true of the
adherents of any other civilizational movement, such as
Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism, or Socialism.
For what purposes a symbolic constellation can be
used in society depends partly on the character of the
constellation and partly on the needs of society. It
would seem impossible for Romanticism to be brought
into the same close relationship to the state as Taoism
has been: "under every dynasty priests furnished supportive tokens to the central government and performed rituals for its security." The extreme individualism of the Romantic dramatic design, its obligation
to seek and express individual authenticity, the correlated perception of established structures as prisons,
and the fragmentary form of organization of knowledge
characteristic of Romanticism make its institutionalization as a church, or a series of churches, for any
protracted length of time, unlikely. It is not as closely,
even in psychotherapy, linked with healing as (religious) Taoism and therefore does not have the leverage
on power which the ability to heal and to exorcise
demons represents, and it has not acquired rituals that
can be shared, standardized, and kept apart from what
appears as the daily life of its adherents. By virtue of its
individualistic, spontaneity-asserting, self-critical, and
ironic elements Romanticism would be far more subversive than Taoism of any state in whose support it
might, temporarily and in part, be mobilized. While
Taoism presumes the basic soundness of Chinese civilization, Romanticism senses fundamental distortions
not only in Western civilization of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, but it would sense such distortions
in the practical and theoretical arrangements of any
civilization in which it could exist. Thus Romanticism is
not easily usable in support of existing power. On the
other hand, in Western civilization more easily mobilizable (because more authoritarian) ideological supports
have been available to states, so Romanticism was less
34
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needed as a state religion than Taoism might have been
in China. Romanticism has, however, been influential
in various types of nineteenth-and twentieth-century
political movements—left and right—before their acquisition of power. "Perhaps Romanticism is something which should not achieve length and breadth, but
which should flare up in this meteoric way if it is to
bring forth its concern in a manner impressive and
worthy of credence." But the temporariness of basic
Romantic impulses makes it all the more important to
inquire into which more durable structures of practice
Romantic impulses pour their energies. (And what effects of Romanticism endure in those shaped and then
disappointed by it.)
The "objective contributions" of such symbolic constellations as Romanticism or Taoism, in their full diversity, to the development of Western and Chinese
civilizations can be adequately traced out only when a
more complete understanding of the general types of
civilizational processes, and their psychological dimensions, than we currently possess is in hand.
In estimating these contributions, one has to take into
account not only the effects of the direct insertion of
elements of a particular symbolic configuration into
various spheres of sociocultural life, but also (a) its
mixes with other cultural systems, (b) its distortion as,
in the course of its popularization, it comes to speak less
for the general cultural concerns of its originators and
more for the immediate social interests of its adherents,
and (c) the unanticipated and even counter-productive
results of its institutionalization under various material
conditions.
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What I have been talking about are all hypotheses and
questions, and evaluations of one's own stance toward
life and intellectual position in the light of the accumuPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1980
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lated experience of mankind, conceived as building
blocks toward a cooperative construction of a set of
tools for comprehending the significant differences
between and within all civilizations.
What we need most at present are careful histories, or
archeologies, of each component of major civilizational
designs. We need histories of the various elements of
each cultural configuration and movement, and culturally sensitized histories of the social systems with
which these symbolic designs have interacted. We need
histories of the social classes and of the human types
from which humanity's symbolic configurations have
been selecting their adherents and enemies. We need
analytical accounts of what has happened to various
symbolic designs and social systems in inter-civilizational as well as intra-civilizational encounters.
Perhaps it could all be summed up by saying that we
need a world-wide linked series of histories of perception (or rather of perceptual frames).
Neither at the beginning nor at the end can we forget
to ask: What effects have the various symbolic designs
generated, at various times, in particular spheres of
social practice—in law, psychotherapy, economic conduct, marriage and child raising, religious experience
and organization, political institutions and processes,
and sociological theorizing?
What have been the practical energies not only of the
major religions and ideologies, but of every symbolic
design that has exploded upon the imagination of mankind, particularly if it has remained memorable for
many generations or if its loss has not ceased to hurt?
What can civilizational analysis discern in what is
now taking place in these spheres that is less visible to
other methods of deep questioning and selective affirmation of ourselves in the world?
37
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Notes

*) Presidential Address, presented at the ninth annual meeting of
the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, on May 22-25, 1980, at Syracuse University.
•In a comparative study of Ghana, India, and Brazil, "We did not
find any greater cross-national similarity in values among workers
in the more modern, capital-intensive technological settings than
among workers in less modern, labor-intensive settings," Frederick Fliegel, Andrew J. Sofranko, James O. Williams, Navin C.
Sharma, "Technology and Cultural Convergence: A Limited Empirical Test," Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 10 (1979),
p. 3.
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the
History of an Idea (New York: Harper & Row, 1960); Alvin W.
Gouldner, For Sociology: Renewal and Critique in Sociology
Today (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973), pp. 323-366.
M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973). It
is the separation of nature and spirit, when both remain significant, that requires the Romantic investigator,—in contrast to the
observer of picturesques and the pure sentimentalist,—to pay
attention in principle both "to the qualities in the observed object
and to the reactions of the observing subject." Hans Eichner, ed.,
'Romantic' and Its Cognates/The European History of a Word
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 36. But the
Romantic methodological preference for "a light comparison, a
few lines traced in the sand" (Novalis) over systematic research
has produced a tendency not to pay sufficient attention to the
"observed object" as it exists outside of our perceptions of it.
When the totality is finished and in itself undeveloping, the alienation of nature and spirit (or some equivalent kind of alienation,
such as that of "facts" and "values") unresolvable, and art not
the act of reconciliation, but the means of gaining stoic insight into
the unresolvable state of affairs. Romantic consciouness is replaced by Tragic consciousness, in which only the abstract (and
therefore in principle repeatable) overall scheme matters, but not
the unique particularities of individual lives within it, as they do in
the Romantic structure of consciousness. On the Tragic consciousness, see Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1967); and Lucien Goldman, The Hidden God: A
Study of the Tragic Vision in the Pense'es of Pascal and the
Tragedies of Racine (London: Routledge & Regan Paul, 1964).
Black Romanticism exists almost from the beginning of Romanti2
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cism, in a pure form, since de Sade. But it becomes proportionately more important (and culturally acceptable) as time
goes on.—The typical Romantic metaphor is something that is
simultaneously, but in clearly distinguishable ways, artificial and
natural: such as the Romantic prison of French and Russian literatures, in which spiritual regeneration occurs, or the deep mask
through which alone the genuine rises to the surface. But in dark
Romanticism—Poe, Baudelaire—the key metaphor seems to become something that is either simultaneously life and death (e. g.,
the erotic death) or neither life nor death while appearing, in some
ambiguously outrageous way, to be both, la technique in Ellul's
book, the city in some contemporary American fiction.
Noriko Mizuta Lippit, "Western Dark Romanticism and
Japanese Aesthetic Literature," Yearbook of Comparative and
General Literature, No. 27 (1978), pp. 77-83. On the idea of communication between the grotesque City of Night and the "normal"
City of Day in English Romanticism, see Paul Hamill, "Other
People's Faces: The English Romantics and the Paradox of
Fraternity," Studies in Romanticism, 17 (1978), pp. 465-482.
Denis de Rougemont, Love in the Western World, Rev. Ed. (New
York: Harper & Row, 1974); Mario Praz, The Romantic Agony,
2nd Ed., (London: Oxford University Press, 1951); Peter Larsen
Thorslev, The Byronic Hero: Types and Prototypes (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1962); A. K. Thorlby, The
Romantic Movement (London: Longmans, 1966); Patricia A.
Parker, Inescapable Romance: Studies in the Poetics of a Mode
(Princeton University Press, 1979). It is on the level of sensibilities
that native "analogues to Romanticism" are most likely to be
found in non-Western civilizations—the Japanese, Chinese, Indonesian, Arabic, Indian.
'Lionel Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1974); Vytautas Kavolis, "Moral Cultures and Moral Logics" Sociological Analysis, 38 (1977), pp.
331-344. Compassion is one of the two major motives behind the
strong interest of the Romantics, especially French and English, in
the salvation of Satan, that is a sinner whom even official Christianity, a few exceptions aside, has abandoned as hopeless. The
other motive is sympathy for the assertion of authenticity—
rebellion against established authority. Maximillian Rudwin, The
Devil in Legend and Literature (La Salle, 111.: The Open Court
Publishing Company, 1931), pp. 280-308. Authenticity is closely
linked with rebellion in the Romantic mind, which makes it difficult to comprehend non-rebellious kinds of authenticity or to be
authentic when rebellion is not called for (or impossible).
'Romantic self-restraint arises either from an eighteenth-century
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natural sensitivity to others (Shaftesbury's "moral sense") or
from a nineteenth century ironic awareness of the closeness of
one's "constructive" acts to being "destructive" (Friedrich
Schlegel). Systematization of self-control, in the sense of a
monastic or military discipline, seems, from the Romantic point of
view, both dishonest and insensitive, even when it "works."
On the concept of the form of organization of knowledge, see
Claude Le'vi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1966); Lovejoy, The Great Chain, op. cit.;
Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology of Human
Societies (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970); Robert A. Nisbet,
Social Change in History: Aspects of the Western Theory of
Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969); Joseph
Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. 2: History of
Scientific Thought (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1956).
For a vivid description, from a Western point of view, of the
Chinese form of organization of knowledge, see Eric Voegelin,
Order and History, Vol. 4: The Ecumenic Age (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1974, p. 295.
"Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in
Nineteenth Century Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 8.
W. H. Auden, The Enchafed Flood or the Romantic Iconography
of the Sea (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 111.
The Letters of Rosa Luxemburg, edited with an introduction by
Stephen Eric Bonner (Boulder, Colo.: West view Press, 1978), pp.
179, 203.
The givenness within can be conceptualized as the unconscious,
the primordial, or the archetypical. From the Romantic point of
view it is most authentic when grasped directly and untheoretically.
Zevedei Barbu, Problems of Historical Psychology (New York:
Grove Press, 1960), pp. 145-179; Etienne Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy: Variations on a Theme (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 226-254. For some differences
associated with the rise of a militant religious dualism, see E. R.
Dodds, Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety: Some Aspects
of Religious Experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1970).
Abrams, op. cit.
The Autobiography of Richard Baxter (London: J. M. Dent &
Sons, Ltd., 1931), p. 10.
'I. M. Lewis, Ecstatic Religion: An Anthropological Study of Spirit
Possession and Shamanism (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1971). For an interpretation of English Romantic poets as failed
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shamans, see Ross Woodman, "Shaman, Poet, and Failed Initiate: Reflections on Romanticism and Jungian Psychology,"
Studies in Romanticism, (Spring, 1980), pp. 51-82. Woodman
locates the roots of this failure in the lack of an analytical method
(or perhaps ritual) for mastering the monsters of the depths evoked
by the Romantic imagination.
J. D. Legge, "Sukarno: Traditional or Modern Leader?" in Wang
Gungwu, ed., Self and Biography: Essays on the Individual and
Society in Asia (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1975), pp.
171-184.
On Taoism, see Holmes Welch, Taoism: The Parting of the Way
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); Holmes Welch and Anna Seidel,
eds., Facets of Taoism: Essays in Chinese Religion (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1978); Needham, op. cit.; J. W. Freiberg,
"The Taoist Mind: A Case Study in a 'Structure of Consciousness,"' Sociological Analysis, 36 (1975) pp. 304-322; PeterJoachim Opitz, Lao-tzu. Die Ordnungsspekulation in Tao-teching (Miinchen: Paul List Verlag, 1967); Liu Ts'un-Yan, "Taoist
Self-Cultivation in Ming Thought," in Wm. Theodore De Bary
and the Conference on Ming Thought, Self and Society in Ming
Thought (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), pp. 291330: Donald J. Munroe, The Concept of Man in Early China
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969); Da Liu, The
Tao and Chinese Culture (New York: Schocken Books, 1979).
As a consequence of its preference for the extraordinary, Romantic thought is inadequate in comprehending the "merely" ordinary, everyday reality unimproved by the imagination. The
danger is particularly great in political theory. But the extraordinary can be understood only against a background of a sound
science of the ordinary. Hence the need of European Romantics
for American sociology—the question of the latter's "soundness"
temporarily suspended.—English Romantics, in their conscientious manner, have perhaps been more respectful of the structures
of ordinary life than any other. Hamill, op. cit.
"Novalis in 1789: "The world must be romanticized. . . . When I
give the common a high significance, the ordinary a mysterious
appearance, the familiar the dignity of the unfamiliar, the finite the
semblance of the infinite, then I romanticize it." Quoted from
Eichner,op. cit., p. 124. There is here a sober distinction between
what "reality" is without the imagination and the "significance"
which imagination adds to it. Psychoanalytic writers make a similar distinction when they insist that "the lack of fantasy life"
produces a chronic state of boredom. Martin Wangh, "Boredom
in the Psychoanalytic Perspective," Social Research, 42 (Autumn, 1975), p. 542.
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The insignificance, in the Romantic scheme of things, of most of
the world as it is without the addition of imagination to it pertains
not to people, but to their experiences. Romantics do not uphold
any social elite identifiable by its position or reputation, but they
insist on the possibility of hierarchies of qualities. The quality of
extraordinariness ("poesy") is in principle available to a socially
low-ranking individual, or the disesteemed, and is indeed more
typically attributed by Romantics to him (or her) than to the
stereotyped "middle-class mediocrity" of the lower reaches of
Romantic imagination. The Romantic scheme of things is intended
to make ordinary people capable of sustaining extraordinary experiences. This is the explanation of its popular roots, where it
connects with certain elements of folk literature. But, as in folk
tales, so for the Romantics, the extraordinary cannot be artificially
constructed where it does not spontaneously (or miraculously)
arise. It is the artificial, willed, technically competent construction of the extraordinary which makes the idea of the extraordinary dangerous. But one should think that the Romantic theory of
evil contains enough warnings against it.
When Romantic designs are "vulgarized," they seem, to someone
who thinks he understands "true" (that is, late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century) Romanticism, as no longer Romantic.
But in the Taoist tradition, in spite of the immense differences
between "philosophical" and "religious," "literary" and "popular" Taoism, all of them have been easily thought of as legitimately Taoist. One does not normally speak of "vulgarized"
Taoism. This difference in attitudes toward "high" and "low" in
the two traditions does not seem to be an accident of scholarly
conventions, but to arise from the essential contrast between the
"puritan" selectivity of Romanticism and a "profligate" embracingness of Taoism. For an argument that the meaning of
"Taoism" be restricted to religious Taoism, see Michel
Strickmann, "History, Anthropology, and Chinese Religion,"
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 40 (June, 1980), pp. 201-246,
esp. p. 207. Taoism is, after all, primarily shared religion, while
Romanticism is primarily individual imagination.
"Norman S. Fiering, "Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of
Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism," Journal
of the History of Ideas, 37 (1976), pp. 195-218.
Two other dramatic designs complete the analytical scheme: tragedy and burlesque. The tragic design is an existential form for
struggle by individuals or collectivities capable of independent
action against principles or forces superior to them, in a universe
containing a meaningful, but contradiction-carrying invisible
order. Tragedy is a struggle against a superior force amidst con-
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tradictions that matter more than the mind comprehends. This
broad definition would seem to cover both Greek tragedy and
Japanese "nobility-of-failure" stories. However, "Chinese narrative is replete with individuals in tragic situations, but the secure
inviolability of the underlying affirmation of existence in its totality precludes the possibility of the individual's tragic fate taking
on the proportions of a cosmic tragedy." Andrew H. Plaks, "Towards a Critical Theory of Chinese Narrative," in Andrew H.
Plaks, ed., Chinese Narrative: Critical and Theoretical Essays
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1977). p. 352.
While tragedy may not be a universal form there are also significant differences in the treatment of the form in civilizations which
possess it.
When the burlesque is defined as a dramatic design for upheavals against order by "chaotic" forces normally believed to be
inferior to it in rationality, morality or general respect-worthiness,
do we not have a cross-cultural universal which emerges in the
imagery of the trickster in whom features of the animal, the clown,
the shaman-magician-witch, and the rebel are fused, as they are
also in the image of the Jew in European anti-Semitic thought, in
the Japanese image of the Burakumin, and generally in the dramatic designs, allocated to the outcastes everywhere?
Historically, different dramatic designs have tended to be associated with particular social groups—the tragic with a threatened
aristocracy (or with threatened groups imbued with aristocratic
values); the comic with the peasantry and the bourgeoisie; the
burlesque with low ranking and outcaste groups (although today
alienated bureaucrats and many literary humanists are grateful
enough for whatever the burlesque has to offer); the romantic with
independent poet-intellectuals (who have inherited, but are no
longer bound by, traditions of aristocratic combat as well as those
of individual religious quest); the visionary with priests and
prophets, whether religious or profane. Once these designs have
originated in a particular context, they are of course available for
use in other contexts, but then their meanings change, mixed types
result, and we find ourselves in today's world, where tragedy is
believable only when it is simultaneously burlesque.
In Taoism, the only essential alienation is that of the artificial, or
artificializing, particular (culture, the techniques of spiritual development when separated from proper attitude, self-assertions)
from the natural-spiritual totality. No alienation of nature from
spirit, which is the essential alienation of Romanticism, is conceivable.
It is by this conception of adulthood that Romantic education and
psychotherapy would be guided.
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In the Taoist treatment of sickness, the body-spirit unity is also
manifest, but its spiritual aspect seems to have an active priority in
causing sickness to the body and must therefore be purified, in an
early second century A. D. version of the practice, by a confession in triplicate, for the body to recover physical health. Pei-yi
Wu, "Self-Examination and Confession of Sins in Traditional
China," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 39 (June, 1979), pp.
5-38. While exposure to Romanticism has had psychotherapeutic
effects—e. g., on John Stuart Mill—, no formalization of therapy
is intrinsic to Romanticism as such, as it is to religious Taoism. It
has, however, influenced the development of the differentiated
system of medical psychotherapy. But the role of Taoism in
Chinese science and medicine is both far deeper and more prolonged.
In secular Romanticism the emergence of evil has to be explained.
The idea of a permanent, unexplainable evil has a place only
within a sacralized version of Romanticism.
"Rigidity, in the sense of absoluteness and exclusiveness—the
rigidity of rationality, of tyranny, but also the rigidity of goodness
and of God—is one of the two main sources of evil in the Romantic
imagination. Walter H. Evert, "Coadjutors of Oppression: A
Romantic and Modern Theory of Evil," in George Bornstein, ed.,
Romantic and Modern: Reevaluations of Literary Tradition
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 29-52; John
Porter Houston, The Demonic Imagination: Style and Theme in
French Romantic Poetry (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969); Karl S. Guthke, "Der Mythos des Bosen in der
Westeuropaischen Romantik," Colloquia Germanica, 1968 1/2,
pp. 1-36. The other main source of evil is disgust at the "endless
emptiness" into which God has collapsed under the influence of
the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Evil is connected, in the
"Romantic theology," with the syndrome of emptiness, rigidity,
rationality, collapse of imagination, and tyranny, with various
elements being given more emphasis by different Romantics.
(Feminine images of evil seem to represent either wholly denatured spirit or wholly despiritualized nature at either its most
beautiful or most ugly. See Praz, op. cit.)
The Romantic cult of childhood has much to do with the absence
in children of all forms of typically Romantic evils. The message of
Romantic childhood is: recollect the beginnings, imagine the destination. Even pschoanalysis, with its more Puritanic conception
of childhood, has not succeeded in abolishing the hold on the
popular mind of the Romantic view of childhood.
It is "the very impossibility of using the term in a positive sense
without some consciousness of its negative implications" that
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"ultimately contributed to the development of what was to be
called 'romantic irony.'" Eichner, op. cit., p. 21. The antidote to
some aspect of Romanticism (e. g., the intensity need of Romantic
sensibility) usually emerges on a different plane of its cultural
organization (e. g., in this case, the givenness within of Romantic
psychology). Critiques of Romanticism which do not pay attention
to all its planes are fundamentally misconceived.
For the perhaps more common view that Romanticism has corrupted Liberalism, see Charles Frankel, "Does Liberalism Have a
Future?", Research Institute on Institutional Change, The Relevance of Liberalism (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978), pp.
97-120.
Strickmann, op. cit., p. 211.
Karl Barth, Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl (New
York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 229.
Cf. my "Social Movements and Civilizational Processes," forthcoming in the Benjamin Nelson Memorial Volume.
"For instance: While Romanticism equalizes the sexes, it would
seem—in spite of Hugo and Yeats—to put old age at a disadvantage, more so than the traditions it competes with in the West.
(See, however, David Luke, "Howls It That You Live, And What
Is It That You Do?: The Question of Old Age in English Romantic
Poetry," in Stuart F. Spicker, Kathleen M. Woodward, David D.
Van Tassel, eds., Aging and the Elderly: Humanistic Perspectives
in Gerontology (Atlantic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press,
Inc., 1978) p. 221, for the argument that prior to the Romantic
period, "the old man generally entered English literature only as a
comic and peripheral distortion of the norms and ideals of various
social roles. Thus his development in much Romantic writing as a
central, sympathetic, and symbolic character is indeed distinctive." Romantics have made old age more than merely a social
problem for the secular imagination—in the same spirit in which
they have made more than a social problem of alcoholism, crime,
or homosexuality.) Taoism is equally accessible to the old and the
young, indeed perhaps more attractive to the old. But while, in
comparison to Confucianism, it does advance women, it does not
in practice equalize the sexes, in spite of its preference for feminine symbolism and a few female immortals.
Romanticism has clearly contributed to improving the condition
of children in eighteenth-century English and French aristocratic
and middle-class families. No comparable effect of Taoism on
childhood seems to be demonstrable.
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